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Welfare analysis of non-fundamental  
asset price and investment shocks:  
implications for monetary policy 
Frank Smets and Raf Wouters
1 
1. Introduction 
The occurrence of large asset price fluctuations in the late 1980s and early 1990s raised a good deal 
of discussion among economic researchers and policymakers regarding whether and how central 
banks should respond to asset price fluctuations. One view (eg Bernanke and Gertler (2000)) 
suggests that central banks should take into account asset price movements only as far as these 
fluctuations have an impact on expected future inflation and output. This view also seems to describe 
fairly well the point of view of many policymakers (eg Greenspan (2002) or Goodfriend in BIS/CEPR 
(1998)).
2 An alternative view (eg Borio and Lowe (2002)) is that central banks should lean against 
large run-ups in asset prices, even if this risks undershooting the short-term inflation objective, 
because excessive asset price booms may lead to a sudden collapse, undermining the stability of the 
financial system and leading to large negative knock-on effects on output and prices. This view has 
recently received some support from policymakers (eg Issing (2003)), although a number of difficulties 
are typically identified. First, the policy-controlled interest rate may only be a very blunt instrument to 
control asset price bubbles and their inherent risks for future financial stability. Second, policymakers 
may have no comparative advantage in identifying whether asset prices are driven by fundamentals or 
not. 
As the most recent downturn coincided with a sharp decline in investment expenditures and falling 
stock markets, the role of asset prices in monetary policy has again become very topical. The over-
accumulation of capital in various sectors, associated with the preceding spectacular run-up in stock 
prices, led to a capital overhang and contributed to the size and the duration of the investment decline. 
Monetary policy has therefore been accused by some observers of not having paid enough attention 
to the asset price bubble that developed in the second half of the 1990s. 
This paper analyses the costs and benefits of alternative monetary policy responses to 
non-fundamental asset price or investment shocks in a New Keynesian general equilibrium model. 
One advantage of using a micro-founded model is that the utility of the representative consumers can 
be used as a natural benchmark for analysing welfare. The model used is estimated and discussed in 
Smets and Wouters (2003a) and includes, amongst various other estimated structural shocks, both an 
investment-specific technology shock and a non-fundamental shock to equity prices. This paper, first, 
analyses the welfare costs of the non-fundamental equity price shocks when monetary policy is 
characterised by the estimated policy reaction function. It identifies various components of the welfare 
cost - inefficient inflation and wage dispersion, the cost of variability in consumption and employment, 
costs of adjusting investment plans and inefficiencies in the intra- and intertemporal allocation of 
resources - and discusses their relative importance. One major finding of this analysis is that the 
welfare cost of the non-fundamental shocks strongly depends on the steady state level around which 
the economy is fluctuating. If the steady state output level is below the first-best competitive output 
level, positive booms in economic activity driven by non-fundamental shocks to stock prices can be 
                                                       
1  Frank Smets: European Central Bank and CEPR, e-mail: Frank.Smets@ecb.int, and Raf Wouters: National Bank of 
Belgium, e-mail: Rafael.Wouters@nbb.be. The views expressed are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the European Central Bank or the National Bank of Belgium. 
2  This result is also confirmed by empirical research on the Fed’s reaction function. Rigobon and Sack (2003) estimate the 
response of interest rates to equity price innovations, and find that this response seems to correspond with the impact that 
one can expect from these innovations on future output and inflation. Other policymakers have, however, mentioned that 
asset prices need some specific attention, for instance because of the imbalance between the time horizon of the typical 
forecast exercise for inflation and output on the one hand and the long-run implications of financial cycles on the real 
economy on the other hand (Issing (2003)).  
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welfare-improving, as they move the economy closer to the optimal output level. In contrast, 
recessions are extra-costly for the opposite reason. 
In a second step, the paper then investigates the costs and benefits of alternative monetary policy 
rules. One finding is that the welfare costs of asset price shocks can be drastically reduced by a 
relatively strong response to inflation and the output gap. Another finding is that, in view of the 
asymmetry in the welfare costs of positive and negative asset price shocks, policymakers can improve 
welfare by responding less aggressively to booms than to busts. Such a policy will lead to a rise in 
average output, but at the cost of somewhat higher inflation. 
Our analysis is most closely linked to Dupor (2001), who investigates the optimal monetary policy 
responses to asset price fluctuations under commitment from the perspective of the welfare of the 
representative household. He analyses the policy trade-off between goods price and asset price 
stability that arises when asset prices are influenced by inefficient shocks or bubbles and therefore 
cause inefficient real allocation decisions.
3 Overall, he shows that the optimal response to positive 
asset price shocks involves an undershooting of inflation in the short term. 
A number of papers have analysed actual monetary policy behaviour during and following asset price 
booms (eg Borio and Lowe (2002) and Detken and Smets (2003)). Overall, asset price booms are 
characterised by a boom in output and investment and a more moderate increase in inflation. One 
interpretation of this evidence is that asset price booms tend to develop during periods with positive 
supply shocks that might increase expectations of future profits and productivity. Generally, periods of 
asset price booms also seem to be characterised by a relatively weak response of monetary policy 
(Detken and Smets (2003), Borio and Lowe (2002)). However, often the response to financial cycles is 
asymmetric: while monetary policy is rather reluctant to intervene in periods of booms, it intervenes 
much more aggressively in periods of financial crisis. During these periods, it is clear that an 
intervention of the monetary authorities is needed to stabilise the functioning of the financial markets 
and to avoid further disruptions in the financial system as a whole. 
At the same time, the limitations of the current analysis for understanding the costs of financial 
volatility and imperfections need to be clearly spelled out. The model used does not contain a 
specified block for the financial sector. Moreover, the asset price shocks are introduced in an ad hoc 
and exogenous fashion. A full welfare analysis of the importance of non-fundamental asset price and 
investment cycles should be based on a model that can endogenously generate such asset price 
cycles. The optimal policy response may very well depend on the source of the financial market 
imperfections that lead to such non-fundamental financial and real volatility. One step in that direction 
has been taken by Bernanke and Gertler (2000). They develop a model in which information problems 
and capital market imperfections can explain why financial asset prices deviate from fundamentals and 
exert a specific influence on economic developments.
4 Bernanke and Gertler (2000) nevertheless 
conclude that a monetary policy that is concentrated on targeting inflation with a strong response on 
expected inflation and potentially the output gap is the appropriate monetary policy strategy. In their 
view there is no need to have a specific response to asset prices.
5 However, because the analysis is 
done in a linearised version of the model, they do not address the policy implications of the non-linear 
response of the external finance premium to various shocks. Indeed, one argument for a pre-emptive 
policy response to large asset price booms is that because of collateral constraints the output costs of 
an asset price collapse are larger than those of an asset price boom (eg Kent and Lowe (1997) and 
                                                       
3   Dupor (2002) extends this argument by noting that central banks are confronted with uncertainty and limited information on 
the nature of the asset price fluctuations. Such uncertainty makes the response of monetary policy to asset price shocks 
less aggressive. As discussed above, this is a traditional argument used by central bankers to motivate their non-response 
to rising asset price markets. Advocates for a more proactive policy argue that the uncertainty in evaluating financial 
markets and asset prices is perhaps not higher than that in interpreting output gaps. Some recent studies have established 
forecasting methods to evaluate different types of asset and credit market expansions (eg Borio and Lowe (2002)). 
4   Bernanke and Gertler (2000) develop a financial accelerator model that generates an impact of financial asset prices mainly 
via wealth effects on consumption and via net worth or collateral effects on firms’ investment decisions. They do not include, 
however, a direct impact on investment via the non-fundamental asset price. Investment decisions are based on the 
fundamental value of the projects. In our model the non-fundamental asset price directly influences the investment decision. 
5   Cecchetti et al (2000), using a very similar model, draw less unambiguous conclusions. They observe that including a 
specific reaction to asset prices in the monetary policy rule will cause a higher inflation variability but a lower output 
variability and the final choice therefore depends on the policymakers’ preferences.  
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Bordo and Jeanne (2002)). The model used in this paper does not capture such asymmetric costs and 
therefore cannot address the optimal policy response in such a context. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the model structure and its estimation are 
briefly discussed and the effects of a non-fundamental equity price shock are illustrated. Section 3 
then presents the welfare costs of such shocks. Finally, Section 4 considers alternative monetary 
policies. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Model structure and estimation results 
The model used in this paper is a standard dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and 
wages and with capital accumulation. The model contains several real and nominal frictions and is 
augmented with a complete set of structural shocks in order to fit the data. Two of those shocks 
directly influence investment spending. One captures the influence of technology shocks that affect 
the production of capital goods or the capital accumulation process. The second is related to shocks in 
the external financing conditions of the firms and is for simplicity labelled the equity price shock. This 
last shock should typically take up all the influences on investment expenditures that originate from 
non-fundamental fluctuations in financial markets or asset prices. 
The model does not contain a financial sector and there are no financial frictions or capital market 
imperfections that might influence the behaviour of households or firms. In general, it is quite difficult to 
find evidence that financial variables provide significant additional explanatory power for investment 
expenditures. The type of financial variables that matter for investment seem to vary from country to 
country and over time. This indicates that the mechanisms at work are complicated and time-varying 
processes that are not easily modelled. For the time being, it seems acceptable therefore to consider 
the influence of financial markets and asset prices on the real sector as independent shocks that enter 
the model exogenously.
6 
In this section we briefly present the structure of the general equilibrium model and the parameter 
estimates of the model. For a more detailed discussion we refer to Smets and Wouters (2003a). The 
impulse response function following a non-fundamental investment shock is discussed in detail. 
2.1 Model  structure 
In what follows we briefly explain the structure of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model, which is a standard New Keynesian general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition in 
the goods and labour market. Prices and wages are sticky and determined by a Calvo model that 
allows for indexation to past inflation levels for these price and wages that are not reset optimally. 
Nominal stickiness and indexation were estimated to be important. Capital accumulation is subject to 
adjustment costs that are expressed in terms of changes in the investment level. Household utility is 
characterised by habit persistence. These three features of the model will be important in the 
calculation and the evaluation of the welfare outcomes. 
2.1.1  The household sector 
Households maximise the following welfare function: 






























t c hC C E l  (1) 
                                                       
6   The ideal solution would be to have a model that is able to generate the bubble process endogenously. Gilchrist et al (2002) 
have recently developed a model where an increase in the dispersion of investors’ beliefs under a short-selling constraint 
can result in a rise of the stock price above the fundamental value. The model predicts that managers will react to such an 
event by issuing new equity and increasing capital expenditures. Using the variance in the earnings forecasts to identify the 
bubble shocks in the asset price, they find that such orthogonalised bubble shocks have significant effects on Tobin’s Q and 
real investment.  
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where β  is the discount factor, 
B
t ε  and 
L
t ε  are the two preference shocks and the instantaneous utility 
function is separable in consumption, relative to the past consumption level reflecting the habit in 
preferences,
7 and labour effort.  c σ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion of households and  l σ  
represents the inverse of the elasticity of work effort with respect to the real wage. 
Households maximise their objective function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. 
Households’ total income is given by the sum of wage income, rental returns on capital corrected for 
the costs related to the degree of capital utilisation and dividend payments. Total income is used for 
consumption or investment expenditures: 
( ) t t t t t t t
k
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which states that the marginal rate of intertemporal subsitution should equal the real interest rate. The 
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Households own the capital stock that they rent out to the firm-producers of intermediate goods at a 
given rental rate of 
k
t r . Households choose the capital stock, investment and the utilisation rate in 
order to maximise their intertemporal objective function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
and the capital accumulation equation, which is given by: 
[] () [] t t t
I
t t t I I I S K K 1 1 1 1 − − − ε + τ − = , (5) 
where  t I  is gross investment, τ is the depreciation rate and  () . S  the adjustment cost function, which is 
a positive function of changes in investment level. Fluctuations in the investment level will result in a 
higher adjustment cost, leading to lower net investment accumulation. The process 
I
t ε  represents 
shifts in investment-specific technological progress. This fundamental shock to the investment 
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The first-order conditions for capital, investment and the utilisation rate are given by: 
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S Q  (7) 
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t z r Ψ′ =   (8) 
Equation (6) states that the value of installed capital Q is equal to the discounted value of the 
expected future returns as captured by the rental rate times the expected rate of capital utilisation 
minus the utilisation costs. The value of installed capital is also influenced by an exogenous iid shock 
which we label the equity premium shock. Equation (7) determines the optimal investment level given 
                                                       
7    In the welfare calculations we assumed the habit persistence is expressed relative to the household-specific past 
consumption level. In the estimated model, the habit preference was expressed in terms of the aggregate wide past 
consumption level. For the empirical estimation of the model the difference between the two models is not important. In the 
welfare evaluation, the external habit persistence yields quite complicated results because of the externality effects. By 
retaining the internal habit specification we avoid these problems.  
150  BIS Papers No 22
 
the value of installed capital and the investment adjustment cost function. Equation (8) relates the 
optimal degree of capital utilisation to the rental rate. 
Finally, households also supply labour effort and set the wage rate. Wages are set according to the 
Calvo model allowing for a partial indexation to the previous period’s inflation level. 
This maximisation problem results in the following markup equation for the optimal wage: 
() l
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i t U +  is the marginal disutility of labour, 
C
i t U +  is the marginal utility of consumption, 
w γ  is the 
degree of indexation, 
w ξ  the Calvo probability and  w λ  the markup included in wages. Equation (9) 
shows that in a flexible wage context, this equation would simplify to the traditional condition that 
wages equal a markup over the marginal disutility of work divided by the marginal utility of 
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reflecting the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function to define the aggregate labour supply index. 
2.1.2  The firm sector 
Output in the intermediate goods sector is produced by the following technology: 
Φ − ε =
α − α α 1
, ,
~
t j t j t
j
t L K y ,  (11) 
where 
α εt  is the productivity process,  t j K ,
~
 is the effective utilisation of the capital stock given by 
1 , ,
~
− = t j t t j K z K ,  t j L ,  is an index of different types of labour used by the firm and Φ  is a fixed cost. 
Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between firms within each period. Cost minimisation implies 














  (12) 
Under these assumptions the firms’ marginal cost is independent of the production level and only a 
function of the factor prices and productivity level: 
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() ()
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Firms set prices according to the Calvo model with partial indexation: 















































where  p γ  is the degree of indexation,  p ξ  the Calvo probability and  p λ  the markup incorporated in the 
price. 
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2.1.3 The  central  bank 
The monetary authorities follow a generalised Taylor rule by gradually responding to deviations of 
lagged inflation from an inflation objective (normalised to be zero) and the lagged output gap defined 
as the difference between actual and potential output (Taylor (1993)). Consistently with the DSGE 
model, potential output is defined as the level of output that would prevail under flexible prices and 
wages. 






t t y t t
p
t t Y t t t t t Y Y Y Y r r Y Y r r R R η + − − − + π − π + − + π − π + π ρ − + ρ = − − ∆ − π ∆ − π − 1 1 1 1 1 1  (16) 
The parameter ρ captures the degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, there is also a short-run 
feedback from the current changes in inflation and the output gap. 
R
t η  and  t π  are two monetary policy 
shocks: the first one represents the typical iid interest rate shocks, while the second one captures the 
long-run trends in the inflation objective of the central bank. 
2.2  Estimation results and evidence on the non-fundamental investment shock 
Smets and Wouters (2003a) estimate a linearised version of the model discussed above. The 
parameter estimates are summarised in Table 1. For estimation purposes, a linear approximation is 
sufficient, because the impact of the different identified shocks over a finite horizon is not significantly 
influenced by the higher-order terms. Of course, as discussed in Kim et al (2003), this argument does 
not apply for the welfare analysis performed in the next section. 
The left-hand column of Table 1 contains the estimated parameters describing the behaviour of the 
stochastic shocks in the model. Smets and Wouters (2003a) estimate a whole series of shocks that 
can potentially influence the economy: a shock to total factor productivity, a shock to the intertemporal 
time preference of households, a shock to the relative weight of consumption and labour supply in the 
utility function, a government expenditures shock and a shock to the investment adjustment cost 
function (or to the capital good-specific technology). These five fundamental shocks to technology or 
preferences are assumed to follow a persistent first-order autoregressive process. In addition, Smets 
and Wouters (2003a) also allow for three markup shocks that affect the pricing in the goods market, 
the labour market and the market for existing capital goods. These three shocks produce inefficient 
price and allocation decisions and are assumed to be iid.
8 
The analysis in this paper concentrates on the latter of those three markup shocks, the inefficient 
equity price shock, which creates non-fundamental movements in investment expenditures. This iid 
shock, which can take a positive or negative sign, is of a somewhat different nature than the much 
more persistent asset price bubble shocks that are typically considered in the research on monetary 
policy and asset prices.
9 However, it has the same qualitative effects on output, investment and 
inflation as those shocks. As discussed in the introduction, a more sophisticated approach would 
model the underlying distortions that generate the bubble and the way firms react to such 
non-fundamental movements (see Gilchrist et al (2002) for such a model). 
 
                                                       
8   We motivate this identification sheme in Smets and Wouters (2003b). Under uncertainty about the nature of the shocks, a 
robust discretionary monetary policy will favour interpreting persistent shocks as fundamental shocks that affect the natural 
output level and therefore need to be accommodated. Short-run fluctuations that do not seem to produce a persistent effect 
can be excluded in the estimation of the natural or efficient output level without creating risks of large errors. This implies 
that a persistent negative shock to the investment expenditures will be considered to have a negative effect on the natural 
output level the central bank is targeting. If the central bank were to consider it wrongly as an inefficient low investment 
level, and react by lowering the interest rate, this would lead to a rise in inflation and inflation expectations that would be 
very costly to overcome later. Under discretion, a more careful conservative monetary policy is beneficial. This argument is, 
however, less applicable for shocks that are less or not persistent. Therefore iid shocks can be classified as non-efficient 
shocks. 
9   Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Cecchetti et al (2000) and Dupor (2002) all consider persistent asset price bubbles, with or 
without a random duration. As in our case, the shocks are, however, introduced in an exogenous and ad-hoc fashion.  
152  BIS Papers No 22
 
Table1 
Estimated parameters of the DSGE model 
Parameters defining shock processes  Parameter describing private agents 
Standard errors of the innovations:      
Productivity shock  0.59  Investment adjustment cost  5.91 
Inflation objective shock  0.02  σ consumption utility  1.61 
Consumption preference shock  0.25 h  consumption habit  0.54 
Government spending shock  0.32  σ labour utility  0.75 
Labour supply shock  1.35  Fixed cost  1.49 
Investment shock  0.10  Calvo employment  0.59 
Interest rate shock  0.12  Capital utilisation adjustment cost  0.17 
Equity premium shock  0.60     
Price markup shock  0.16  Calvo wages  0.76 
Wage markup shock  0.28  Calvo prices  0.91 
   Indexation  wages  0.66 
   Indexation  prices  0.41 
Persistence of the processes:    Parameter describing monetary policy rule:   
Productivity shock  0.83  r inflation  1.66 
Inflation objective shock  0.92 r  d(inflation)  0.20 
Consumption preference shock  0.91  r lagged interest rate  0.94 
Government spending shock  0.97  r output  0.15 
Labour supply shock  0.96  r d(output)  0.17 
Investment shock  0.94     
Source: Smets and Wouters (2003a). 
 
 
In Graph 1, we reproduce the impulse response of the non-fundamental investment shock using the 
non-linear model.
10 It is worth noting that this impulse response is very close to one in the estimated 
linear version of the model. 
The shock immediately affects the price of installed capital, but due to its temporary nature only for 
one quarter. The price of existing capital increases by some 7% for a one standard error shock. Firms 
react immediately to the higher value of existing capital stock by increasing investment expenditures. 
The presence of capital accumulation costs in the form of changes in the level of investment implies 
that investment will only gradually return to its steady state level. Investment expenditures increase by 
1% for the average shock and the shock dies out completely after four or five years. 
                                                       
10   The non-linear model is solved under the assumption of perfect foresight using Dynare (Julliard (2003)). For the 
deterministic simulations Dynare uses a Newton-type algorithm.  
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Graph 1 
Impulse response function following the  
non-fundamental investment shock in the non-linear model 
 
 
Higher investment expenditures increase total aggregate demand by 0.2% and aggregate employment 
by 0.1%. The positive output gap will lead to an increase in the marginal cost as a consequence of 
rising wages and lower productivity. The impact on inflation is limited for several reasons. First, the 
estimated degree of nominal stickiness is relatively large. Second, monetary policy responds relatively 
strongly to the positive output gap. This restrictive policy reaction will create a crowding-out effect on 
private consumption, which lowers the overall aggregate demand expansion. Lower consumption also 
lowers the pressure on wage demands via the higher marginal utility of wages. Finally, the investment 
expansion also contributes to production capacity, increasing labour productivity. Summing up, the 
non-fundamental equity price shock increases investment and output significantly over a horizon of 
two to three years, but under the estimated monetary policy response the impact of the shock on 
inflation is very moderate. Although the size and the persistence of the effect of our shock on asset 
prices is not comparable to the much more persistent movements in asset prices during typical asset 
price booms, the qualitative effects are relatively similar to those of a standard asset price bubble as, 
for example, described in Borio and Lowe (2002) and Detken and Smets (2003). 
Smets and Wouters (2003a) discuss the contribution of the various shocks to unconditional variance of 
the forecast errors in the observable variables. This variance decomposition indicates that the 
non-fundamental investment shocks explain around half of the forecast error of investment at the one 
quarter ahead horizon, but this contribution decreases very quickly for longer horizons. The 
contribution to the one quarter ahead forecast error in output is between 10 and 20% and also 
decreases quickly afterwards. The low persistence in the effects also explains why the contribution to 
the inflation process is very small. A historical decomposition (Smets and Wouters (2003c)) 
nevertheless shows that during specific periods the shocks have a significant impact on investment 
and output, but not on inflation. At longer forecast horizons, the fundamental investment shocks 
explain most of the fluctuations in investment and around 20% of output fluctuations. However, it is 
important to note that it is very difficult to distinguish the fundamental (persistent) from the 
non-fundamental (temporary) shocks, in particular because equity prices were not used in the 
estimation of the model. As the empirical identification is purely based on whether the shocks are 
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persistent or not, one could also treat the persistent investment shock as non-fundamental. Obviously, 
this would increase the role of non-fundamental equity price shocks. Ultimately, a more realistic 
estimate of the importance of non-fundamental asset price shocks needs to be obtained by including 
information from asset prices in the estimation of the model. 
3.  The welfare implications of non-fundamental investment shocks 
Non-fundamental equity price and investment shocks create several types of inefficiencies. First of all, 
they result in an inefficient intertemporal allocation of resources. An overestimation of the present 
value of the future returns from current investment expenditure leads to an over-accumulation of 
capital. The actual return on capital will not compensate for the forgone utility from present 
consumption. Second, positive demand effects from an asset price and investment shock lead to 
positive inflation in prices and wages. In our Calvo model this creates welfare costs through the 
dispersion in prices and wages and the resulting misallocation of resources among firms in the 
monopolistically competitive sector. Different prices and wages for otherwise similar products result in 
a lower consumption or labour bundle for a given nominal budget. Inflation also implies that prices 
deviate from the marginal cost plus markup. Finally, there are the costs of changing investment plans. 
In general, these welfare costs will create a trade-off problem for optimal monetary policy. As shown in 
Dupor (2002), inflation stabilisation can more or less be obtained by setting the interest rate so as to 
stabilise total aggregate demand. However, stabilising the equity price and the resulting investment 
response will typically require a more restrictive policy and a larger crowding-out of other private 
expenditures. This will lead to an undershooting of the short-run inflation response. In deciding how 
strongly to respond to the non-fundamental investment shock, it is therefore important to have an idea 
of the relative size of the different costs that are involved. 
The relative importance of these different costs is dependent on the steady state situation around 
which the fluctuations occur. If the steady state is around the optimal competitive output level, all 
non-fundamental fluctuations, both positive and negative, will be costly. However, if output is far below 
the efficient output level due to the markup distortion, higher demand can move the output level 
towards the first-best level and this generates welfare gains. These welfare gains have to be balanced 
against the rise in inflation that may result from an asymmetric response to the equity price shocks, 
further complicating the welfare analysis. Dupor (2001) studies the impact of a deterministic 
non-fundamental shock on welfare around the efficient steady state output level. He analyses the 
problem in a model with monopolistic competition and markup pricing, but he introduces an output 
subsidy financed by a lump sum tax, so that the steady state output equals the competitive level. 
In the next section, we first calculate the welfare effects of a deterministic non-fundamental equity 
price shock. Given the identification problem discussed above, we analyse the effects of both the 
temporary and persistent investment shock. The latter type of shock compares well to the typical 
bubble shocks that are considered in Dupor (2002) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001). For comparison 
reasons, we also report the welfare effects of a fundamental investment shock that is caused by a 
change in the relative price of capital goods. For each of these three types of shocks, we study the 
welfare effects around the competitive equilibrium steady state output level and around the lower 
monopolistic competition equilibrium. We try to disentangle the different components of the welfare 
effects and show how the different frictions influence the relative size of the welfare effects. Next, we 
discuss the outcomes from a stochastic simulation exercise, based on a second-order approximate 
solution of the model. Also in this case, we calculate the different components of the welfare loss.
11 
                                                       
11    The welfare evaluation is based on the exact perfect foresight solution to the non-linear first-order equations for the 
deterministic shocks and on the second-order approximation solution of the model for stochastic simulations. These 
calculations were performed using Dynare (Julliard (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002)).  
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3.1  Welfare analysis of a deterministic non-fundamental investment shock  
around the competitive equilibrium (CE) output level 
Table 2 summarises the results for each of the three types of shocks around the CE output level. The 
first shock corresponds to the estimated temporary equity premium shock in Smets and Wouters 
(2003a) (illustrated in Graph 1). The shock has a standard error of 0.08. The effects of a positive and a 
negative shock are reported for later use when discussing issues of asymmetry. 
Overall, the impact on welfare of this shock is small. This is not surprising as all the first-order 
conditions are fulfilled around the CE output level and therefore small disturbances do not create large 
inefficiencies. To assess the size of the impact on welfare, we follow the literature and express the 
change in welfare in terms of consumption equivalents. We calculate the change in certainty-
equivalent consumption in percentage of its steady state level that yields exactly the same variation in 
the expected lifetime utility that follows from the shock. Since we consider one-time deterministic 
shocks in this exercise, we also express the consumption effect as a percentage of a one-period 
consumption level. The benchmark non-fundamental investment shock has an impact on welfare that 
is comparable to a 0.02% change in the consumption level.  
 
Table 2 
Welfare effects of a distortionary investment shock  
around the CE output level 
Iid shock  Persistent shock  Fundamental shock 
 
+ shock  – shock  + shock  – shock  + shock  – shock 
Total welfare effect  –0.0003  –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0005  0.0725 –0.0721 














































































The second column reports the welfare effects of the more persistent shock, which corresponds to the 
persistent investment shock in Smets and Wouters (2003a). This shock has a much more persistent 
and hump-shaped effect on investment and output and is very similar to the shock considered in 
Dupor (2002). Taking into account that the shock considered in Dupor (2002) is some five times 
bigger, the welfare effects of the shocks are somewhat smaller in our setup, but the size is of the same 
magnitude. Differences are partly due to differences in the modelling of the investment adjustment 
cost function and the habit persistence process. 
Table 2 also decomposes the welfare effects into the most important elements. First of all, there is the 
cost of inflation measured by the degree of price and wage dispersion. This cost is estimated by using 
the index for price and wage dispersion (similar to the expression presented in Benigno and Woodford 
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where θ  is the price elasticity of demand, which is itself related to the markup  () 1 / 1 − θ θ = λ + w . 
The moderating impact of partial indexation on the dispersion measure is clear from this expression. 
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These dispersion measures appear in the aggregate utility function as a cost that augments the input 
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The size of these inflation dispersion costs taken together only makes up some 10% of the total 
welfare cost. This relatively small size is somewhat surprising especially within the framework of a 
Calvo model. Erceg and Levin (2002) have stressed that the Calvo model produces very large welfare 
effects of price stickiness, compared for instance to the Taylor-type stickiness with fixed duration 
contracts. Rotemberg and Woordford (1997) also find a very high coefficient on the inflation dispersion 
term in their second-order approximation of the welfare function. In our model, indexation to past 
inflation and habit persistence in the utility function reduce the relative weight of inflation dispersion in 
this approximation. The impact of partial indexation to past inflation on the inflation dispersion costs 
can easily be evaluated. Keeping all other parameters constant, the assumption of indexation reduces 
the welfare costs of price and wage dispersion in our model by half. A more important explanation for 
the small inflation costs is the very mild response of inflation following this type of non-fundamental 
investment shock. As explained above, this is due to the estimated monetary policy rule together with 
the flexible technology assumptions. 
The second important component of the welfare loss refers to the adjustment costs that have to be 
incurred when firms change their investment plans. These costs take the form of a fraction of 
investment expenditures that does not result in an increase in the capital stock. The higher the 
volatility of the investment flows, the higher the fraction of investment that will be lost. These 
investment adjustment costs account for 40% of the total welfare cost following the temporary equity 
price shock and for about 10% following the more persistent investment shock. 
A third component of the welfare cost that can be identified is the loss that results from the variance in 
the consumption and labour supply flow. We calculate this component from the second-order 
approximation to the utility function: 
()( () ) () ( )
2 2 ˆ 1 5 . 0 ˆ 1 1 1 5 . 0 t t L L L cte C C h C h l
l σ + ∗ ∗ ∗ + σ + − ∗ − ∗
σ σ −
 (20) 
Finally, the remaining loss is due to inefficiencies in both the intra- and intertemporal allocation of 
resources. Intratemporal inefficiencies are caused by the frictions in prices and wages, which imply 
that prices and wages do not reflect the marginal cost of production or the marginal disutility from 
labour effort. The intertemporal inefficiencies are caused by the non-fundamental shock as discussed 
above.
12 The variance terms and the remaining first-order inefficiencies explain about 25% of the total 
welfare cost. 
For the more persistent shock the composition of the welfare loss changes slightly. Inflation raises 
relatively more under the persistent shock and the contribution in the costs is therefore somewhat 
higher. The same applies for the responses in consumption and labour and this increases the variance 
term. The more persistent shock is better anticipated by definition and therefore creates less volatility 
in investment and less capital adjustment costs. 
                                                       
12   Both components could be identified if we were to consider the impact of the shock in the flexible price-wage model. 
However, the overall impulse response function of the shock changes strongly in the flexible price model and this makes the 
comparison less interesting.  
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The fundamental investment shock, caused by a persistent shift in the relative price of the capital 
goods, produces a totally different picture. The welfare effects of such a shock depend of course on 
the sign of the shock: a positive shock implies a temporal increase in the productivity of the capital 
good producing sector and therefore leads to an expansion of the production potential of the economy. 
The size of the welfare effect is much higher compared to the costs discussed above. Of course, over 
time positive and negative shocks cancel each other out and therefore the welfare implications of 
these shocks have to be analysed in a stochastic simulation. This analysis will be performed in the 
next section. 
3.2  Welfare analysis of a deterministic non-fundamental investment shock around an 
inefficiently low (MCE) output level 
Now we turn to the discussion of the welfare effects of a non-fundamental investment shock around an 
inefficiently low steady state level of output caused by the markups in a monopolistic competitive 
world. The welfare effects of the non-fundamental shock are strongly asymmetric under this 
assumption and the effect of a positive shock on welfare even turns out to be positive. A positive 
shock increases the output level and employment. Nominal stickiness prevents prices and wages from 
adjusting quickly to the higher marginal costs and marginal disutility levels, so that the markups are 
temporally reduced. This will move the economy towards the efficient output level that would prevail in 
the absence of markup distortions. In the estimated model, these welfare gains turn out to be much 
higher in magnitude than the costs from inflation, capital adjustment or increased variances.  
 
Table 3 
Welfare effects of a distortionary investment shock  
around the lower MCE output level 
Iid shock  Persistent shock  Fundamental shock 
 
+ shock  – shock  + shock  – shock  + shock  – shock 
Total welfare effect  0.0095  –0.0117  0.0297 –0.0304  0.0932 –0.0927 











































































The welfare gain from a positive non-fundamental shock in the benchmark case is similar to a 0.6% 
increase in the steady state consumption level. The cost of a negative shock is somewhat larger 
because all the welfare effects go in the same direction but also because of the concave relation 
between welfare and output, which implies that the welfare costs are increasing as one moves further 
and further away from the first-best output level. 
Gali et al (2001) derive similar welfare effects from business cycle fluctuations that are driven by 
stochastic movements in the inefficient wage markup. If business cycle fluctuations are associated 
with variations in economic efficiency, they show that periods of booms imply lower inefficiency and 
therefore higher welfare, while recessions are leading to lower efficiency and welfare losses. These 
welfare losses of recessions are higher than the welfare gains of booms because of the concave 
relationship between welfare and their efficiency gap measure. They also indicate that these welfare  
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costs are potentially important compared to the traditional costs from efficient fluctuations around the 
competitive steady state level. However, they do not discuss fully the implications for monetary policy 
that follow from these asymmetric welfare effects. 
3.3  Welfare analysis: the stochastic case 
In order to approximate the welfare effects in the stochastic case we use a second-order 
approximation to the model solution.
13 We compare again the welfare results around the CE efficient 
steady state output level and the lower MCE output level.  
 
Table 4 
Welfare effects of a distortionary iid investment shock  
in a stochastic simulation 
  Steady state output CE  Steady state output MCE 
Total welfare effect  –0.1020  –0.0847 



























The welfare effects of both exercises are very similar. The temporary non-fundamental shocks 
generate a welfare loss that is equivalent to around 5% of the steady state output level (one period). 
Price and wage dispersion and the variance term make up only a small fraction of this cost. Capital 
adjustment costs explain 25 to 30% of the cost and the linear inefficiency term explains the remaining 
60-65%. This high proportion of the cost that is related to the inefficiencies caused by the investment 
shock suggests that a monetary policy that takes into account the non-symmetric welfare effects of the 
shock might have a substantial impact on these welfare costs. This point will be further analysed in the 
next section. 
4.  Welfare implications from alternative monetary policy responses to the 
non-fundamental investment shock 
The previous welfare analysis assumed that monetary policymakers were following the estimated 
generalised Taylor rule. In this section, we perform stochastic simulations assuming alternative 
monetary policy rules in order to analyse the impact of monetary policy behaviour on the welfare 
effects of the shock.
14 Again we start by assuming, first, that the economy is fluctuating around the 
                                                       
13   We performed these calculations with Dynare (Julliard (2003)) using the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) algorithm for the 
second-order approximation solution. 
14   We leave an analysis of the optimal monetary policy response for future research.  
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efficient competitive economy output level. This exercise will allow us to compare our results with the 
discussion in the literature on how monetary policy should react to asset price shocks. Next, we 
consider the same exercise around the lower monopolistic competitive equilibrium (MCE) output level 
and discuss how this affects the implications for monetary policy. 
4.1  Monetary policy and non-fundamental investment shocks around the CE output level 
Under these assumptions, optimal monetary policy from a welfare perspective is faced with a trade-off 
between stabilising inflation and stabilising investment. Stabilising investment will imply a stronger 
reaction to the non-fundamental shock, so that other private expenditures are crowded out further and 
inflation will become negative. In order to illustrate the impact of monetary policy on the welfare 
outcome, we consider some simple policy rules starting with a rule that responds only to inflation. 
The simple policy rule with a very moderate response to inflation (a coefficient of 1.1) does a poor job 
in terms of welfare outcome. Under this rule, the standard deviation in the inflation process is twice as 
high as under the more aggressive inflation policies, and this increases the welfare costs of the price 
and wage dispersion by a factor of four or more. However, all components of the welfare cost increase 
under the weak inflation policies. A stricter anti-inflation policy (with a reaction coefficient of 1.7) not 
only reduces the cost of inflation but also helps to overcome part of the other inefficiencies related to 
the non-fundamental investment shocks. Augmenting this rule with a reaction to the output gap (to 0.5 
as in the traditional Taylor rule) further reduces the efficiency costs. These outcomes confirm the 
results presented by Bernanke and Gertler (2000). The estimated policy rule, which is close to a first 
difference rule with a relatively strong coefficient on inflation, performs reasonably well in terms of the 
welfare implications. 
The next step would be to evaluate whether the inclusion of a specific response to the price of 
installed capital in the policy rule might improve the outcome in the fully stochastic model with multiple 
sources of disturbances. However, with larger and more persistent shocks in the model, the second-
order approximation methods often generate unstable solution paths.
15 
To take into account the possible complications that arise due to the non-linearity of the model, we 
also consider the estimated policy rule augmented with an asymmetric reaction on the growth rate. 
The asymmetric policy rule that we consider is of the following type: 
() () ( ) {} + − + π − π + π ρ − + ρ = − π −
p
t t Y t t t t t Y Y r r R R 1 1 1  
  () ( ) ( () ()
R
t t t y t t Y Y r r η + − ∗ κ − κ + π − π − ∆ − π ∆ 1 1 exp 1  (21) 
The linear impact of output growth in the policy reaction function (16) is replaced by a non-linear 
asymmetric relation. The parameter κ  determines the degree of asymmetry. In Graph 2, the impact of 
output growth on the interest rate is compared for the linear relation and a weak (κ =10) and a strong 
(κ =25) asymmetric relation. The persistence in the policy rule spreads this asymmetric effect through 
time but the degree of asymmetry that is considered remains very moderate. 
Although we did not expect a major impact for the case around the CE output level, this rule does 
seem to improve the welfare results. An asymmetric policy response is able to generate positive 
efficiency gains in this stochastic setting compared to the deterministic steady state result.
16 These 
efficiency gains, which are calculated as the residual in Table 5 between the total welfare effect and 
the identified components, are of a similar magnitude to the costs from inflation, capital adjustment 
and volatility. 
                                                       
15  Kim et al (2003) discuss the issue of instability of the second-order approximation methods and possible solutions. 
16  At this point, we have no intuition to explain this puzzling result. But given the highly non-linear nature of the model and the 
utility function, the result is not impossible.  
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Graph 2 
Reaction coefficient on impact of the interest rate on GDP growth 
 
4.2  Monetary policy and non-fundamental investment shocks around the lower MCE 
output level 
The results for the simple rules remain valid for the stochastic simulations around the lower output 
level in a monopolistic competition context with level distortions. A stricter inflation policy and a 
reaction to the output gap can limit the costs of the non-fundamental shock, but the impact on the 
linear term measuring the inefficiency is less sensitive to the monetary policy rule here than it was in 
the previous table. 
In this case, the benefits from an asymmetric monetary policy response to the non-fundamental shock 
are clear. An asymmetric policy response is able to take full benefit from the positive investment 
shocks that move output towards the more efficient production level. In contrast, policy is relaxed more 
rapidly at times of negative investment shocks in order to minimise the negative consequences for 
output. On average, this asymmetric policy response can be considered as a more accommodating 
monetary policy because the real interest rate will be lower on average while inflation and the nominal 
rate will be higher on average. The question then arises whether such a policy can be credible and 
whether the assumption of commitment to the policy rule is still valid in this context. 
The results in Table 6 show that the average inflation rate under the asymmetric policy rule is above 
the deterministic steady state level. At the same time the average investment and output level in the 
stochastic simulation are also above the deterministic steady state. The asymmetric policy creates a 











































Welfare effects of a distortionary iid investment shock under alternative monetary policy rules 
Results from the stochastic simulation with the second-order approximation methods 
Stochastic simulations around the CE steady state output level 
Benchmark Simple  rules    Asymmetric  policy 
 
Estimated rule  Weak π policy  Strong π policy  + Output –gap  Weak  Strong 
Total welfare effect  –0.1020  –0.1700 –0.1093 –0.0878 –0.0640 –0.0092 
































































































































Welfare effects of a distortionary iid investment shock under alternative monetary policy rules 
Results from the stochastic simulation with the second-order approximation methods 
Stochastic simulations around the lower MCE steady state output level 
Benchmark Simple  rules Asymmetric  policy 
 
Estimated rule  Weak π policy  Strong π policy  + Output –gap  Weak  Strong 
Total welfare effect  –0.0847  –0.1373 –0.1341 –0.1129  0.0126  0.1650 
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These results illustrate that if output is fluctuating below the first-best output level, the task for an 
optimal monetary policy from the welfare point of view is much more complicated. Our conclusions are 
in contrast with most of the results presented in the literature, where the optimal monetary policy is 
derived as the linear policy rule that is optimising a quadratic approximation of the welfare function 
subject to the linearised model (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). Most of this literature assumes, 
however, that there exist lump sum taxes and subsidies that compensate for the impact of markups on 
the steady state equilibrium level. These instruments can be used by fiscal policy to offset the 
distortions in the economy. The recent paper by Benigno and Woodford (2003) drops this assumption 
but still retains the assumption that the optimal fiscal policy is stabilising the markup distortion over 
time, so that the optimal monetary policy can still be described as the solution from a linear-quadratic 
problem. In the real world it is difficult to imagine that fiscal policy is indeed able to reproduce the first-
best outcome or to adjust optimally from period to period. Therefore, the analysis of optimal monetary 
policy in the presence of markup distortions is more appropriate to mimic real world policy questions. 
5. Conclusions 
Large asset price and investment cycles that are difficult to motivate by fundamental factors generate 
complicated decision problems for monetary policymakers. General equilibrium models can be helpful 
in sorting out the welfare effects of the different inefficiencies that are generated by these cycles. 
Model solution methods based on higher-order approximations are necessary for this welfare analysis 
and can increase our understanding of the issues involved. This paper is a first attempt to perform 
such an analysis using a standard estimated sticky price and wage general equilibrium model. 
However, a lot of work remains to be done. First, the estimated non-fundamental equity price shock 
we analyse in this paper is different from what observers traditionally understand as a typical asset 
price bubble. More realistic, but exogenously generated bubble processes could be introduced in the 
model quite easily. These might already change part of our conclusions because these bubble 
processes are expected to burst at a certain point in the future and generate negative investment and 
output consequences at that point. If the size of these negative output effects is sufficiently important, 
this might change the policy reaction drastically as the welfare effects of possible future output 
declines can easily dominate the welfare gains from more moderate short-run output expansions. This 
last effect might even be strengthened if the transmission effect of asset price fluctuations to the real 
economy is also asymmetric with a much larger impact during the bursts. In such a scenario monetary 
policy actions today may serve as an insurance policy against larger losses in the future.
17 In reality 
the decision problem might therefore be a much more complicated and dynamic problem. 
Furthermore, there is also the identification issue to distinguish between fundamental and 
non-fundamental asset price movements. However, if the efficiency gains from higher output levels are 
the dominant factor in the welfare analysis, this difference might not be as important as it is in the case 
of fluctuations around the first-best output level. 
Ideally, asset price booms should be modelled as endogenous processes, probably related to the 
uncertainty and heterogeneous expectations about fundamental shocks. Alternative monetary policy 
rules may affect the probability of asset price booms and bursts in such a setup. Asymmetric policy 
rules may also create a moral hazard issue by providing one-sided protection against the negative 
risks. Understanding these mechanisms together with more knowledge about the transmission 
mechanism from these financial variables to the real economy would make the policy conclusions of 
this type of research much more robust. Introducing financial frictions, firm-specific capital and 
heterogeneous agents will certainly be ingredients for future research in this context. 
                                                       
17   See Bordo and Jeanne (2002) for an analysis of this argument.  
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